Founded 2026

The narrative

How the record gets told, on both sides of it.

This is the one page on this site that argues. The archive records what was said and done, each entry dated and sourced; the evidence page draws the narrowest conclusion those entries will support, and says so. This page reads further than that, on its own authority, and carries no sources of its own. Read it as a position rather than a record, and check it against the entries - that is what they are for.

One story, and every fact fitted to it

A frame is not a lie. It is a decision about which facts are news and which are noise, taken before any particular fact arrives. Coverage of Russia in the Western press has a settled one, and its tell is that no fact disturbs it: a success is a threat, a failure is proof of decay, and a number that is neither gets ignored or explained away.

Take a number that carries no verdict on its face. Measured at purchasing power parity, the Russian economy passed the German one and has stayed past it. On the International Monetary Fund's own figures Germany was ahead through 2020, Russia has led every year from 2021, and the distance has widened in each year since. For a country under the broadest sanctions regime ever assembled against one, that is at minimum an interesting result.

It went almost unremarked when it happened. It became a story in 2024, when the World Bank's comparison round made it awkward to leave alone, and it arrived pre-answered: purchasing power parity is the wrong measure, the figure is inflated by arms production, the war economy will collapse next year. Each of those is worth arguing. None of them was argued while Germany was ahead.

The question nobody asks

Four German survey series carry dated readings on Russia back to 1996. Across thirty years they ask about the Russian state, the Russian president, Russian policy. They almost never ask whether Germans like Russians. The entry below sets out what was asked and what was not.

That gap is not an accident, and it is not innocence either. Asking a country whether it dislikes another people produces an answer nobody wants to print. Asking whether it distrusts a government produces much the same information in a form that can be published on a Thursday. The first question is unaskable; the second has been doing its work.

The distance the polling depends on is thinner than it looks. The president it asks about has held broad support at home for most of the period it covers. The state it asks about is where those people live. When the answers move as far as these have, it is worth asking plainly what was being measured - and the archive is the record of what the polls left out.

The mirror error

Russian state coverage, RT among it, makes the opposite mistake, and it is the more consequential one. It tells the story as governments acting against Russia: Berlin decided, Brussels decided, and the population is a hostage of its leadership that would think otherwise if it were free to.

The record does not support that. A savings bank restricted a customer's card. A university closed its admissions. A tennis association barred players from a tournament. A piano competition excluded entrants. Banks closed accounts. Visa desks turned people away. Not one of those is a government. They are institutions run by ordinary people taking ordinary decisions, and in most cases nobody ordered them to.

Governments are in the record too - a Bundestag paper, an Estonian halt on study visas, Latvian residence permits. Treating them as the whole of it is the error, because it lets everyone else off. If this were only policy it could be undone by an election. What the entries describe looks slower than that.

The cost nobody adds up

Germans are more dissatisfied with their own government than at almost any point in the republic's history. The reason they give is the economy: prices, energy bills, plants closing, a car industry shrinking year on year.

The reason they mostly do not give is the war. The cheap Russian energy that underwrote German industry for four decades is gone by decision, and the decision is seldom named when the consequences are counted. That is this page's reading and not a measurement: no survey asks people to connect a heating bill to a foreign policy, so none reports that they do not.

The absence of that connection is what makes the arrangement durable. A cost you have not attributed is a cost you go on paying.

What this page is not

It is not a defence of the Russian government, which is not this site's subject and gets no help here. It is not a claim that every unfavourable story about Russia is false; most are simply stories, and some are true and grim. It is a claim about proportion and about direction: that one frame has been applied to everything for long enough that its exceptions stopped being visible, and that the mirror image of that frame, sold from Moscow, misidentifies the actors in a way that happens to excuse them. The entries are dated, sourced and correctable. This page is an argument, and arguments are answerable.

Evidence