Across banking, universities, sport, culture and residence, people have been treated according to a passport rather than according to anything they did - and this has been recorded, repeatedly, by the official bodies of the countries where it happened. That is the claim. The country and subject groups below link to the Records it can be checked against, including the complaints that failed and the decisions later reversed. A separate, source-linked comparison assesses government policy; it does not measure attitudes toward Russian people.
Russophobia: the wider context / Pressure on Russia
Germany
Germany appears here more often than any other country, and the record is not anecdotal. The federal government itself told the Bundestag that 196 people with Russian or Belarusian roots had turned to the federal anti-discrimination agency between February and May 2022, and that 74 of their requests concerned banks. The agency published its legal assessment of the banks' practice of contacting Russian customers about a possible sanctions risk. By May 2026 Sparkasse KölnBonn had restricted online banking and card functions on about 2,000 accounts of Russian and Belarusian nationals who had not supplied proof of EU residence status. No individual finding against any affected customer is reported. The four German survey series reviewed in the linked Record chiefly ask about the Russian state, its president and its policies; they do not provide a continuous, comparable measure of attitudes toward Russian people. Two further Records cover the attacks on shops, a school and a church in March 2022 - which two of the sources documenting them also record as instrumentalised - and the federal government's own count of assaults on Russian citizens, a series that begins in 2012 and whose pre-war peak is 2014.
- Contacted by banks over sanctions risk, refused service: Russian nationals complain to the federal anti-discrimination agency ·Berlin, Germany
- German government: 196 people with Russian or Belarusian roots reported discrimination ·Deutscher Bundestag, Germany
- Sparkasse KölnBonn restricted about 2,000 accounts of Russian and Belarusian nationals ·Cologne, Germany
- Thirty years of German polls on Russia, and almost none about Russians ·Germany
- Germany, March 2022: attacks on shops, a school and a church, all connected to Russia ·Berlin, Oberhausen, Munich and elsewhere, Germany
- Assaults on Russian citizens in Germany since 2012: highest in 2024, pre-war peak in 2014 ·Deutscher Bundestag, Germany
- Lithuania brigade: several Bundeswehr soldiers with family ties to Russia or Belarus reportedly rejected ·Germany / Lithuania
The United Kingdom
The Wimbledon record documents one British institution's decision, not the conduct of every British business. Russian and Belarusian players were excluded in 2022; the ban was reversed in 2023. Both the exclusion and its reversal belong in the record. The UK's wider treatment of Russians cannot be inferred from this case alone.
Money and banking
The pattern that touches the most ordinary lives is the bank account. Accounts refused, cards restricted, payments held - decided by nationality or residence status rather than by anything the customer did. A Dutch human rights body examined four customers' complaints about ING. In three it held that the bank had made a direct distinction on grounds of nationality, and that the distinction was not prohibited, because it rested on an EU regulation; in the fourth it found that the bank had registered the customer as Russian in error. All four complaints failed. The effects on customers belong in the record, but so does the distinction between an objectionable experience and a finding of unlawful discrimination.
- Reuters reports EU banks refusing accounts to Russian residents not under sanctions ·European Union
- ING restricted accounts it recorded as Russian; four Dutch customers' complaints failed ·College voor de Rechten van de Mens, Netherlands
- Contacted by banks over sanctions risk, refused service: Russian nationals complain to the federal anti-discrimination agency ·Berlin, Germany
- Sparkasse KölnBonn restricted about 2,000 accounts of Russian and Belarusian nationals ·Cologne, Germany
Universities and study
Admission closed by passport. A university stopped accepting applicants of one nationality; a state stopped issuing study visas to them; and in Czechia the Public Defender of Rights examined what the universities were doing, found that they had restricted access to education by nationality, and said that nationality alone cannot be a reason to bar someone from study. Whatever a government's quarrel is, it is not with a nineteen-year-old applying to study.
- University of Tartu barred new applicants who are Russian or Belarusian citizens ·Tartu, Estonia
- Estonia stopped issuing study visas and residence permits to Russian citizens ·Estonia
- Czech universities refused Russians and Belarusians; ombudsman faulted sanctions office ·Public Defender of Rights, Czechia
Sport and culture
Competitions and stages closed to people by nationality: tennis players, skiers, pianists, gymnasts. This is the theme where the exclusion has already been tested and found wanting - the Court of Arbitration for Sport held that a ban on athletes for their nationality was discriminatory. The pianists and the gymnasts had no such forum.
- Russian and Belarusian players barred from Wimbledon 2022; ATP fined the LTA £820,000 ·United Kingdom
- CAS finds FIS ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes by nationality discriminatory ·Lausanne, Switzerland
- Dublin piano competition barred nine Russian pianists, then reversed the ban ·Dublin, Ireland
- Croatia refused visas to nine of Russia's gymnastics delegation, then issued four ·Zagreb, Croatia
Residence and movement
The most consequential measures are the ones that decide where a person may live. Latvia's migration office told hundreds of Russian citizens - many of them long-settled residents - that they had to leave. Visas refused, permits withdrawn, a life of decades made conditional on a language test or a form.
- Latvia's migration office asked 841 Russian citizens to leave by 13 October 2025 ·Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (PMLP), Latvia
- Estonia stopped issuing study visas and residence permits to Russian citizens ·Estonia
- Croatia refused visas to nine of Russia's gymnastics delegation, then issued four ·Zagreb, Croatia
What official bodies found
Official scrutiny makes these cases harder to dismiss, but it does not produce a single verdict. The EU's rights agency recorded incidents against Russians and Russian-speakers. The German government answered a parliamentary question with a count. A Czech ombudsman and an international sports court criticised or rejected particular exclusions; a Dutch human rights institute examined four complaints about ING, held in three of them that the bank had made a direct distinction on grounds of nationality, and found no prohibited distinction in any. Those different outcomes, including decisions against complainants, are part of the record. A later answer of the German government, in 2026, gave for each year from 2022 to 2025 the number of politically motivated offences in which Russian citizens were reported as victims.
- EU rights agency records police figures on incidents against Russian speakers ·European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, Austria
- German government: 196 people with Russian or Belarusian roots reported discrimination ·Deutscher Bundestag, Germany
- Czech universities refused Russians and Belarusians; ombudsman faulted sanctions office ·Public Defender of Rights, Czechia
- ING restricted accounts it recorded as Russian; four Dutch customers' complaints failed ·College voor de Rechten van de Mens, Netherlands
- CAS finds FIS ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes by nationality discriminatory ·Lausanne, Switzerland
- Assaults on Russian citizens in Germany since 2012: highest in 2024, pre-war peak in 2014 ·Deutscher Bundestag, Germany
Software and open-source projects
One record so far, of a single event in one project. In October 2024 the Linux kernel project removed eleven people from its list of maintainers, among them everyone listed under a .ru address, in a patch addressed to none of them. The ground given, an employer on a sanctions list, was stated only unofficially, five and six days later, and one of the eleven was restored. The record shows the removal, how it was made and what was said about it afterwards; no source read for it establishes that the ground applied to all eleven or that nationality was the criterion. Whether Russian developers are treated differently in open-source projects cannot be inferred from this case alone.
What this does not claim
This is not a claim that ordinary Germans or Britons hate Russians, and it is not a claim that every measure listed here was taken in bad faith. The claim made at the top of this page is narrower than either, and better supported. The archive is incomplete and openly so; the entries that exist are dated, sourced and correctable.
Pressure on Russia
An editorial ranking of the breadth and persistence of documented government pressure, not a measure of prejudice toward Russian people or willingness to start a direct war.
Evidence reviewed:
The tiers consider stated objectives, military commitments, sanctions and trade measures, wider exclusions, and diplomatic conditions. Tier 1 emphasises documented containment extending into cultural or sporting isolation, or an explicit weakening/no-normalisation strategy. Tier 2 groups sustained military and economic pressure. Tier 3 marks a more conditional approach. All invoke peace or security; those aspirations do not determine placement. Common EU sanctions or NATO membership alone do not determine a tier.
This is an assessment of the selected public record, not an exhaustive global index. No ranking within tiers. A lower tier does not establish friendliness or the absence of wider exclusionary policies. Sources can change the assessment. Grouped countries retain their individual facts; budgets, commitments and deliveries are not interchangeable.
1. Broad containment and isolation
| Government or group | Policy and sources |
|---|---|
| Baltic states |
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Their April 30, 2026 Nordic-Baltic statement supports stronger economic pressure and continued Russian isolation in sport and culture, while supporting Russian civil-society defenders. Estonia announced military aid of at least 0.28% of GDP for 2026 and explicitly linked its approach to Ukraine's victory and Russia's defeat. Lithuania budgets 0.25% of GDP for Ukraine support and 5.37% for national defence. Latvia's September 1 import restrictions extend to books, clothing and other goods; its reported 91% import decline covers Russia and Belarus together, from 2022 to 2025. |
| Nordic EU members |
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. They signed the same April 30, 2026 statement endorsing Russian isolation in sport and culture and stronger sanctions, alongside support for Russian civil society. Denmark announced a roughly DKK 4.4bn military package on July 1. Finland's May 29 package was EUR 128m, bringing its reported defence-materiel support to EUR 3.4bn. Sweden reported SEK 128bn in military support as of August 12. These use different periods and currencies; they are not a shared annual budget. |
| Poland |
The 2026-2030 foreign-policy strategy treats Russia as a persistent security threat and advocates weakening its economy, tighter sanctions and no normalisation without a change in Russian policy. It also supports Russian civil society. A September 2 statement calls for further restrictions on Russia's defence and security capabilities. This classification concerns the breadth of pressure, not a declared intention to attack Russia. Poland's same-day diplomatic statement says it does not seek conflict. |
2. Sustained military and economic pressure
| Government or group | Policy and sources |
|---|---|
| Canada |
Approximately C$2bn in military assistance was announced for FY2026-27. September 10 commitments include expanded drone and munitions co-production, about C$350m for air-defence interceptors and a long-term security partnership. These are announced commitments. Canada's more than C$26bn in overall assistance is not all military aid. |
| France |
France combines sanctions and military support with its security-guarantee role alongside the UK. Its September 3, 2026 statement supports further sanctions, Ukraine's continued military self-defence and stronger responses to hybrid attacks attributed to Russia, while calling for a ceasefire and substantive negotiations. A smaller bilateral aid burden alone does not establish a milder policy. The assessment covers the overall policy mix, not a single funding figure. |
| Germany |
The government budgets EUR 11.5bn in military assistance for 2026, including continued air-defence and long-range-capability support. On September 2 it announced closure of the Bonn consulate, restrictions on the Russian House and further sanctions pressure following its attribution of the Leipzig incident to Russia. The attribution is the German government's assessment. Termination of the Russian House treaty takes effect in mid-2027; that is not an already completed shutdown. |
| Netherlands |
The defence ministry confirms EUR 3bn budgeted military assistance in 2026, including training, air defence, artillery and combat vehicles. In August the foreign minister joined calls for further use of immobilised Russian assets. The August 27 letter requests technical options and legal and risk analysis. It is not an already authorised confiscation. |
| United Kingdom |
The July 24, 2026 government factsheet records GBP 16bn in cumulative military commitments, including a GBP 2.26bn ERA loan, and GBP 3bn annually through 2030-31 and longer if needed. The UK co-leads the Coalition of the Willing with France and applies extensive sanctions. Commitments are not all delivered assistance. The assessment concerns government policy, not the views or motives of everyone in Britain. Sources |
3. More conditional pressure
| Government or group | Policy and sources |
|---|---|
| United States |
Financial and energy sanctions continue, and US equipment reaches Ukraine through allied-funded PURL. This coexists with a more conditional negotiating approach. The July 28 administration statement supports proposed further sanctions while expressly retaining presidential waiver discretion and termination authority after a settlement. That statement does not prove enactment of the bill. Allied purchases of US equipment are not US-funded aid, and 'more conditional' does not mean friendly toward Russia. Sources |